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PUBLIC ECONOMICS AS IF TIME MATTERS:  
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY1 
Nicholas Stern 
February 2018 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Tony Atkinson was one of the most thoughtful, creative, prolific and distinguished 
economists the world has seen.  His deep humanity and decency, combined with his 
extraordinary intellectual ability, took him to the most important issues shaping the lives 
and livelihoods of people across the world, particularly the poorest.  At the same time, he 
was constantly challenging and questioning, he never stopped asking whether the 
approaches we were using were capturing the essence of the crucial problems we were 
trying to tackle.  He challenged our profession in the 1960s by bringing, in his first book 
(Atkinson, 1969), poverty and individual circumstances in developed countries to centre 
stage in economics, in contrast to the aggregate, growth and class focus which was 
dominating so much of the discourse in our subject.  And the intensity of his challenge to 
what economists do and how they do it continued to the last decade of his life, including in 
his 2015 book on inequality; indeed, in some ways it became still more intense. 
 
 This paper is an attempt, in part based on discussions with Tony, to articulate his agenda, 
and to add a little of my own, for public economics.  It focuses on that fundamental part of 
the policy agenda which is about how change happens and what happens during change.  It 
asks directly about the processes and pace of change.  In other words, the task is the 
fostering or the creation of a genuinely dynamic public economics.   
 
 We had worked together on the Journal of Public Economics from its beginning in the 1970s 
(I was an editor with him for 17 years from 1981-1998, acting as a co-editor in the 1970s) 
and we never stopped discussing how public economics was faring and where it should go.  I 
think his views on this crystallised and became stronger in recent years and I shall try to do 
justice to them.  In doing so, I shall set out why a dynamic public economics matters so 
much, including and especially for a fundamental issue of our time, which Tony took 
extremely seriously, climate change. 
 
 The study of public economics has not, in its foundations, ignored processes of change but I 
think it is fair to say that they have been either on the margins or much less central than 
they should have been.  Public economics should be about policy for beneficial change.  The 
basic theoretical structure for our starting framework has been a static general equilibrium 
model which is designed to capture some problem or difficulty, which is identified and 
highlighted. The analysis then attempts to analyse and construct policy to manage or 
overcome the problem, as well as possible.  This problem may be a market imperfection, 
externality or public good of the Pigou, Wicksell or Lindahl kind.  Or it may be a constraint 
                                                          
1 I am very grateful to Erzo Luttmer, editor, for helpful comments and to a referee who provided very 
constructive guidance. My greatest debt is to Tony Atkinson for a lifetime of interaction, collaboration, 
inspiration and friendship. The paper draws on my discussion with Tony of August 2016, published in the 
Annual Review of Economics, 2017. 
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on information or tools available to the tax authorities, for example the inability to observe 
skill, which limits the ability to tax as, for example, in the models of Mirrlees, on income 
taxation; or the absence of lump-sum or income taxation in the models of Diamond and 
Mirrlees and others, following Ramsey, on commodity taxation.  This was the great tradition 
of James Meade and it is valuable, focused and powerful.  This standard approach is 
generally about the comparison of equilibrium outcomes under different policies, and not 
about how the change happens or how people are affected along the way, or indeed about 
how the process and pace of change during this policy transition influences what is possible 
in the future. 
 
 The standard approach has been extended to theories of reform, in other words the 
identification of improvements rather than optimality.  Of course, the theory of optimality is 
embedded in the theory of reform; an optimum is a position from which there is no 
beneficial reform.  James Meade, whom Tony knew well and enormously admired, was a 
key figure here, see particularly the mathematical appendix to his classic 1955 book on 
Trade and Welfare (see also, for example, Drèze and Stern, 1990; Guesnerie, 1977). 
 
 There is a different tradition which sees government failure as the pre-eminent difficulty 
and views the problem of public policy, in large measure, as being about getting the 
government out of the way so that the untrammelled market can do its job.  It is argued 
that markets can and will perform the task of achieving efficiency and the fostering of 
initiative in a very effective, indeed in some sense optimal, way, provided the government 
plays a minimal role, confined to some basics, including the rule of law and security. 
 
 Both of these perspectives, and various combinations and variants, work mainly in terms of 
comparative statics; not exclusively but in large measure.  We find two static equilibria, one 
with policy structure A, another with policy structure B, and policy A is better than policy B if 
the outcomes under A are preferred to B under some criterion (or criteria) for assessment. 
 
 For Tony there were many problems with this approach.  As we shall see, the basic perfectly 
competitive structures troubled him when offered as a description of the world.  So, too, did 
many of the criteria commonly used.  And that, the main subject of this paper, the processes 
and pace of change played a minimal role.  A comparison of end points in a process of 
change is, of course, of real value to policy assessment, public discussion and decision-
making.  But, we know that we cannot switch straight from one equilibrium to another, if 
indeed the challenge is about moving from one equilibrium to another.  Further, what 
happens along the way can be of profound importance.  Take one critical example, 
managing climate change.  The phenomenon of global warming is associated with 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, which inhibit the escape of 
infra-red energy and thus cause warming. These stocks or concentrations are a result of 
preceding flows, or emissions.  Hence the path of emissions is critical.  For two paths with 
the same emissions now and in 2050, one may yield much higher concentrations of GHGs in 
2050 than another which reduces emissions later in the period between now and 2050.  The 
path influences not only outcomes within the period but also beyond because, if the stock 
of concentrations is higher at the end, there will be more warming and climate change in 
the years to follow.  Further, many of the damages to environment, natural capital and 
infrastructure will be difficult or impossible to reverse. 
3 
 
 
 Some of Tony Atkinson’s issues for public economics 
 
 As a background or foundation for an examination of what is involved in building a dynamic 
public economics, let me draw on some of Tony’s concerns with the standard modelling of, 
and approaches to, policy issues.  These are based, first, on a one-hour structured discussion 
I had with Tony, on his life and work, in August 2016, published in the Annual Review of 
Economics in 2017 and, second, on the introduction to the new edition of Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, 2015.  Tony raised five issues in our August 2016 
discussion. 
 
 Subject matter or objectives 
 We should, he argued, go beyond aggregates, such as growth or total or average income 
with undifferentiated individuals.  And we should get more specific than generalised social 
welfare functions with their general, but unspecific, vectors of consumption.  Further, these 
vectors are usually dependent only on own consumption.  The generality has its usefulness 
but the lack of specificity loses focus on what matters.  The narrow self-interest embodied in 
the restriction to own consumption is, on the other hand, far too restrictive.  We should try 
to study the issues that do, or should, concern the lives and livelihoods of people, 
particularly those in difficult circumstances, and of those who will come later.  For Tony, our 
subject matter should have at its core: poverty and inequality; living standards understood 
in specific ways such as food, shelter, health and education; environment and sustainability.  
These can be shoe-horned into the standard formulations, but often only in artificial and 
restrictive ways. 
 
 Breadth 
 Tony saw himself as an economist and not as one particular category; he argued that 
narrow self-labelling as, say, “a labour economist” or “industrial economist”, potentially 
limited understanding.  We should start with the issue and bring to it the analytical tools 
and perspectives it requires.  That includes going beyond economics.  He was a great 
example of the approaches that he advocated. 
 
 Modelling 
 Again, focus on the issues and questions.  This may well imply that the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium is not the natural starting point.  He was concerned both with the adjective, 
perfectly competitive, and with the noun, equilibrium.  He saw examples of managers of 
firms pursuing narrow self-interest at the expense of owners, employees, consumers and 
society as a whole.  He saw the destruction of assets and the corrosion of the social fabric in 
the UK in the 1980s as a damaging and unnecessary phenomenon arising from a policy, 
often termed ‘market fundamentalism’, whose motivations appeared to attach little 
importance to processes of change and what they might mean for the people involved. 
 
 Political economy 
 Policy formulation and design should analyse interests and mechanisms that might oppose 
policy reform.  He spoke more and more of the purchase, by very powerful vested interests, 
of policy-makers and policy-making in, for example, the USA. 
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 Process and pace of change 
 For many key issues the process and pace of change will be absolutely central to shaping 
outcomes over time and people.  And the process and pace will be influenced by the above 
four issues that Tony raised directly in our August 2016 discussion.   
 
 Tony Atkinson and Joe Stiglitz revisited the underlying assumptions and approaches of 
public economics, which they had adopted in their 1980 volume, which was designed to 
capture the then state-of-the-art.  They expressed some of their concerns in their 
introduction to Lectures on Public Economics (2015), thirty-five years after the original 
publication.  It is perhaps unsurprising that the experience, often difficult, of those years 
and the advance of economics during that period should give cause for reflection.  The 
ensuing three and a half decades began with the years of the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
years of market fundamentalism, of antipathy towards redistribution and of the Reagan and 
Thatcher approach to the role of the state.  These were years in which, as Tony put it, “I 
think we took a wrong turn” (Atkinson and Stern, 2017, p13).   
 
 Both Tony and I set out our concerns in print at the time (for example, Stern, 1991 and 
1992; Atkinson, 19902) but with little effect.  It often felt as if many Anglo-Saxon economists 
were telling politicians what they wanted to hear, namely something along the lines of “we 
can always improve public policy by having both less of it and a smaller state”, or “the more 
we leave things to the market, the better the outcomes will be.”  In large measure, this was 
mantra rather than careful analysis, although the political and economic history of the 
preceding decades do offer some understanding of how all this happened.  It was, in large 
measure, an intense reaction to the expansion of the state embodied in the structures 
which were built in the two or three decades following the Second World War.  This 
included public monopolies and powerful unions.  No doubt reform was necessary; there 
was much that was dysfunctional and rigid.  But the indiscriminate application of the mantra 
and the destructive outcomes for many troubled Tony.  He was not alone.  
 
 There were some improvements in the rate of growth of productivity in the UK but there 
was much damage to our social and physical fabric in terms of our sense of community and 
mutual responsibility and to the state of our public places and assets; key parts of the 
economy went backwards and protracted unemployment destroyed human capital; and the 
seeds of the 2008 crisis were sewn in the ideology of deregulation ( there is good regulation 
and bad, but there was little effort to understand the difference).  Whilst all that is a matter 
for another paper, it is important to recognise the significance of this period for the way in 
which Tony saw the world and the subject.  
 
 Some of Tony’s reactions, together with Joe Stiglitz’ reading of these events and of the role 
of the economics profession, are reflected in the new introduction to their text book as 
mentioned above.   
 
                                                          
2 Tony’s piece entitled “Public Economics and the Economic Public” was mostly about how to communicate 
clearly and analytically in a quantitative way about the redistribution aspects of public policy, particularly 
taxation.  It was motivated in large measure in reaction to those who wanted to marginalise redistributive 
policies.  
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 Not surprisingly, there is a strong overlap with the issues Tony raised in our August 2016 
discussion.  The first two of their concerns in their new introduction, however, have not 
been emphasised in our discussion so far: the integration of the world economy, which 
requires a much more global approach to policy; and the work of behavioural economics,  
The contributions of the latter have shown clearly the many and important inadequacies of 
the simple model of individual behaviour, in terms of its assumptions of clear and specific 
preferences, and full and immediate optimisation using all available information. 
 
 The internationalisation of the world economy was a remarkable and crucial feature of the 
three and a half decades between the two editions.  The transmission of effects of policy in 
one country across the borders to many others cannot be ignored.  Neither can the mobility 
of capital, firms and people.  Issues of global public goods and externalities, such as climate, 
oceans, epidemics, security (cyber and otherwise), migration and so on have become much 
more prominent. 
 
 Behavioural economics has been one of the great advances in our subject in the last two or 
three decades.  People appear to have what looks like multiple personae; for example, as 
Danny Kahneman (2013) put it “thinking fast and thinking slow” or impulsive and reflective.  
Another way of looking at this is to think of the higher self that, for example, commits to 
eating and drinking sensibly, and the lower self that might let go or binge.  If we assume 
there is just one simple and consistent utility function, we can try to associate an increase in 
welfare of an individual with an increase in utility.  When the ideas of behavioural 
economics are incorporated in our analyses, identifying increases in welfare is much less 
straightforward.  Policy evaluation then appears to require the introduction of criteria 
beyond those derived from individual utility.  That is something with which we must 
grapple.  Amartya Sen’s ideas of capability (Sen, 1999) or ideas of empowerment (Stern, 
Déthier and Rogers, 2005), which I have worked with and tried to develop, are ways of 
broadening and deepening the agenda which do not encounter the problems of the utility-
welfarist approach of standard public economics.  Thus in evaluating or assessing, public 
policy we can ask how it opens up opportunities for people by enhancing, for example, 
health, education, purchasing power, or reducing negative discrimination. 
 
 The example of climate change 
 Climate change raises issues for economic analysis, and beyond economics, which are very 
broad and deep.  We return to them in Sections 4 and 5 below and here describe only 
enough to motivate some of the general ideas on dynamics in public economics in Section 2 
and on objectives and values in Section 3. 
 
 The greenhouse effect refers to the trapping, by the concentrations of GHGs in the 
atmosphere, of the infrared energy which is reflected from the surface of the earth.  The 
trapping occurs though the oscillation of GHG molecules at a frequency that interferes with 
the infrared energy (it is thus the frequency of oscillation of the molecules which 
determines whether or not a gas is a GHG).  Much of that concentration arises from the 
emissions of GHGs as a result of human activity, including from the burning of fossil fuels 
and from deforestation.  The warming takes time to occur and the degree of warming and 
the consequential climate change and its effects are subject to uncertainty.  Many of the 
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effects come via water, or its absence, in some shape or form: storms, floods, inundation, 
drought and desertification, storm surges and sea-level rise, and so on. 
 
 This basic description of how the science works has fundamental consequences for 
economic modelling and the analysis and formulation of economic policy.  This is a problem, 
the science tells us: (a) of public goods (it is the total across all sources of GHG 
concentrations that matter, and hence a problem where international collaboration is 
important); (b) of long-term effects but necessity for short-term action, (c) where, because 
of (b), values, both intergenerational and intragenerational, are key; and (d) where 
uncertainty and risk management are central in a context where risks are potentially 
immense. 
 
Together, these have three consequences for the dynamic analysis of policy which is the 
main subject of this paper.  First, urgency and scale.  The world economy will likely roughly 
double in the next two decades or so (at a possible global growth rate of around 3%).  
Infrastructure will more than double (see Bhattacharya et al, 2016).  This will be in a period 
where we need to cut emissions, absolutely, by 20% to have a reasonable chance of holding 
temperature increases to 2°C (increase in average global surface temperature above the end 
of the 19th century, the usual benchmark).  On current trajectories, we risk eventual 
temperature increase of 3°C or 4°C or more, much of it during this century; we have not 
seen 3°C for around 3 million years.  The dangers are potentially immense3 with possibly 
hundreds of millions or billions having to move, with likely severe and extended conflict as a 
consequence.  And the reasons for movement and conflict could not simply be switched off.  
Cutting emissions by 20% absolutely, as the economy doubles in two decades, clearly 
demands action on pace and at scale. And analysis and action must recognise that if we 
follow old investment patterns, there is a serious risk of “lock-in” of high carbon, long-
lasting capital and infrastructure.  As we shall note, taking action to change the nature of 
investments can be extremely attractive if we invest and plan well, including cities where we 
can move, breathe and prosper, but delivering these vitally important benefits does require 
strong and clear decision-making and substantial investment of the right kind. 
 
Second, the rapid pace and large scale of change required imply that we must pay close 
attention to the processes of change.  How can we understand and influence these 
processes so that we can foster change at the necessary pace and scale?  We must ask 
questions not usually posed in a strong way in public economics: which forms of policy 
induce fast responses?   
 
Third, given the long time scales involved and the intense importance for living standards, or 
indeed existence, of many in future generations, plus strong distributional issues occurring 
now, plus the importance of international action, our analysis must also pay close attention 
to values and social objectives.  To promote agreement we must think through the origins of 
values and objectives and how they are formed and shared. 
 
                                                          
3 The magnitude of the dangers associated with temperatures above 2°C are the reasons scientists have used 
this level of temperature increase as a marker of “dangerous climate change” and why the world set a target 
of “well below 2°C” in the landmark Paris agreement (COP21 of the UNFCCC) in December 2015. 
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Given this agenda, the plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we look at the 
types of modelling for a constructive, dynamic public economics based on the concerns 
raised by Tony Atkinson and on the above issues which loom large in the questions posed by 
policy towards climate change.  In Section 3, we examine the issues around social values and 
ethics, including discounting future outcomes and welfare.  In Section 4 we look at the 
particular issues raised by climate change in modelling impacts and outcomes.  In Section 5 
we examine strategies and policies in relation to climate change, emphasising urgency, 
multiple market failures and infrastructure and including international action.  In the 
concluding section, we go back to Tony’s questions and see where our analysis points.  
Tony’s questions, together with the deep issues raised by climate change, raise many major, 
subtle and difficulty analytical and modelling challenges.  To anticipate the response that 
will emerge from examining the issues and questions: we should build a range of fairly 
simple but informative models focussing on the illumination of particular issues, rather than 
trying to build one grand all-encompassing model.  The art of policy will be to come to a 
judgement and recommendations taking account of the range of models, the data available 
and the combination of qualitative and contextual circumstances that invariably surround 
important decision. 
 
2. TYPES OF MODEL: REAL DYNAMICS 
 
 To claim that we should seek to build a new dynamic public economics should not be seen 
as negative or dismissive.  Time has indeed been strongly present in much of the economic 
analysis of public policy, as I shall argue.  The questions I am raising concern how deeply the 
role of time is captured, and the centrality of time in the core agenda, particularly 
concerning processes and pace of change.  Much or most of our intertemporal analysis in 
public economics is equilibrium and much of it embodies theories of growth.  There is a 
strong focus on the long run and steady states.  What, I am arguing, we need more of is 
theorising about, and models that focus on, the following types of question: what happens 
in transitions; how does the path affect future possibilities; what are risks of extreme 
events; could there be extended traps, how radical change in real time can be fostered and 
managed; could instability arise and, if so, how and with what consequences; how long 
could processes take; who are likely gainers and losers during processes of change; and 
many more?  I think it is fair to say that these types of questions are not generally at centre 
stage.  They should be. 
 
 These are not questions which are greatly illuminated simply by saying that a good 
appearing at a different time is a different good and giving it a time index (although that is 
clearly a helpful convention).  And they are not greatly illuminated by focusing on a 
comparison of end points at the beginning and end of change (although that can be relevant 
and interesting). 
 
 Such questions are of the essence in the economics of climate change, and some are 
examined below.  But I hope it is clear that there are many other critical areas of our subject 
where such questions should also be central.  Four obvious examples illustrate.  The first 
concerns risks of financial crisis and the dynamics that might precede and follow, including 
gainers ex ante, and sufferers ex post.  How fast and dramatic might such happenings be?  
How do the pressures build and for how long?  What can happen to people during the 
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intense period of crisis and the recovery that might follow?  How slow might a recovery be, 
how does it occur, and what could the long-term effects be?  There is surely much more we 
need to understand, for example, about the dynamics of the 2008 financial crisis, both 
before it occurred and in the difficult years that have followed. 
 
 A second example concerns the transition from one kind of economic structure or 
organisation to another.  Of particular relevance in recent decades have been the transitions 
to market economies following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the radical changes in 
economic structures of the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe.  I was closely 
involved in some parts of the process, as Chief Economist of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which was established in 1991 to help facilitate 
and foster the transition.  The process of transition was intense and of great importance; 
millions died in Russia of, it seems, stress-related causes.  Long shadows were cast.  In other 
countries, the process appears to have been less traumatic.  China’s transition has been very 
different and, on many dimensions, extraordinarily successful, although on other 
dimensions, including the environment and inequality, there have been some troubling 
features. 
 
A third concerns economic transformation in wartime. In the UK in the second world war,4 
for example, direct control of labour was used to get a thoroughly different set of goods and 
services produced.  Timeliness was obviously of the essence.  You would not as a guide to 
policy, introduce a reweighting in the social welfare function, and think about taxes that 
could lead you to a different allocation in equilibrium.  That approach would not be wise.  
You would likely be over-run pretty quickly. 
 
 Fourth, technological transformation has been an area where economic historians such as 
Joseph Schumpeter, Chris Freeman and others have indeed been concerned with the 
process of transition and offer, in my view, good examples of how to formulate the right 
type of question.  In “Reflections on Economics” (Besley, O’Donnell and Stern, 2015), Nick 
Crafts and David Soskice, both fine economists but also an economic historian and a political 
scientist, respectively, argue that an historical approach to growth and productivity carries 
powerful lessons about how and why change occurs.  For all of these economists the causes 
and consequences of technological change constitute the central issue, but for all of them 
institutional structures are vital.  Torsten Persson, in the same publication, emphasises 
strategic incentives in the policy-making process itself as core to modern institutional 
economies.  For the “Austrian school” who examine markets as processes of discovery, and 
Friedrich Hayek (1988) and Hyman Minsky (1982), the processes of change, including 
expectations, the limits of understanding and how learning takes place, are of the essence. 
 
 Development economics should be about processes of change.  The best of the literature 
does indeed focus on exactly this.  Prime examples would be Arthur Lewis, Simon Kuznets, 
and Albert Hirschman. These are in strong contrast to Gunner Myrdal or Theodore Schultz, 
who saw poor societies in static equilibrium, although of rather contrasting kinds.  At the 
core of the studies of Palanpur, a village in Moradabad District of Uttar Pradesh in India, on 
which I, with colleagues, have been researching for more than four decades, is the 
                                                          
4 I use the example of my own country. Doubtless other countries at war, or moving into a period of war, have 
made rapid change too; when timing was critical. 
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processes of economics change in the seven decades since India’s independence.  For the 
period 1950-1980, development was driven largely by technological change through 
investment in irrigation and the “green revolution” and, from 1980 onwards, by integration 
into the broader economy. 
 
 Hence we do see in economic history, in the study of technological change, in institutional 
economics and in development economics, excellent examples of a clear focus on processes 
of change. 
 
 But do we see the understanding of the processes of change at the heart of public 
economics?  I would argue, not yet.  Or at least not enough.  Many of the work-horse 
models in the theory of taxation are in the tradition of the Diamond-Mirrlees framework for 
optimal commodity taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).  In optimal growth the possible 
paths are often dominated in their behaviour by the long-run steady-stage growth, to which 
the models are effectively limited by assumption.5  There are, of course, useful examples 
and strands in public economics.  We need many more.  Let me indicate some such strands.  
Some have studied costs of transition to new policy-induced equilibrium (see e.g. Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff, 1987).   
 
 Second, Philippe Aghion and others (Aghion et al., 2012 and 2014) have shown the 
importance of “path dependence” in endogenous growth models.  Third, there are studies 
of policy adaptation to “exogenous change” as a result of technical progress (Faulhaber, 
2004; Hoppman et al., 2014; Ablon and Golay, 2017).  A fourth, rarely studied, concerns 
models which are basically unstable and, for example, as in climate change, could involve 
catastrophic downward spirals, including large-scale loss of life.  The example of climate 
change does involve all four, but particularly the last three. 
 
 There is also progress as outlined in the 2015 introduction to the new edition of “Lectures 
on Public Economics” by Tony Atkinson and Joe Stiglitz, as described above in terms of, for 
example, the implications of monopolistic markets and entry barriers for the taxation of 
capital.  And see Joe Stiglitz’ paper, with results on capital taxation, in this volume where he 
shows the importance of capital taxation as soon as one departs from key simple 
assumptions of the Diamond-Mirrlees framework. 
 
 Empirical work in public economics has become much more sophisticated in recent decades 
with huge advances in the availability of data, in computational power and empirical 
methods.  I think it is reasonable to say, however, that whilst the analysis of the possible 
impact of policies is greatly improved, it is still dominated by empirical comparison of 
different equilibria, with and without the policy change whose effects we are trying to 
isolate. 
 
 With this background and assessment of what we need and how we have progressed, let 
me try to point to some of the elements of existing theoretical tool kits that can help us, 
always remembering that the careful historical analysis of what has happened in the past, 
can be full of insight into how change occurs.  We look very briefly at six modelling issues or 
                                                          
5 Both Tony and I worked on optimal taxation and optimal growth as young men. 
10 
 
lines of argument concerning (i) non-linearities, (ii) expectations and confidence, (iii) 
innovation and entrepreneurship, (iv) endogenous growth, (v) investment, irreversibilities 
and sunk costs, and (vi) political economy.  Each one could constitute a major area of 
analysis and it is not possible to do justice to them all in a part of one section of one paper.  I 
shall try to say enough to show that they can provide valuable insight into important 
features of a real dynamics, “real” in the sense that they can illuminate: how processes over 
time work; where timing of outcomes through the playing out of processes matter; and how 
the sequencing and history along a path can affect future possibilities.  I will restrict myself 
to one paragraph on each. 
 
 I hope that my four examples of areas where time and timing are of central importance 
(from financial crisis to Schumpeterian technological change), together with the six 
modelling issues just set out, show clearly the approaches I am suggesting.  We should be 
building a number of small specific models which can capture key elements of the problem 
or processes.  Policy recommendations come from assembling insights from a number of 
different models, each of which has relevance to key aspects of the questions and processes 
we face.  This is, I take it, an approach similar in spirit to those suggested by Krugman (see, 
for example, his section “In Defence of Little Models” in Krugman, 2000) and Blanchard 
(2018) in macroeconomics.   
 
 What I am counselling against in public economics is the attempt to see everything to one 
grand model which tries to capture almost everything of relevance.  And I am also 
counselling against trying to force a problem with strong and distinctive features into a 
standard work horse, e.g. a neoclassical growth model, where it obviously does not fit.  
Climate will illustrate. 
 
 Non-linearities 
 An early study of how non-linearities could produce interesting dynamics was provided by 
Kaldor in his 1940 Economic Journal paper, “A model of the trade cycle” (Kaldor, 1940)  He 
saw macroeconomic equilibrium in a Keynesian model through the intersection of non-
linear savings and investment functions, both of which were related to output.  He saw the 
two functions shifting over time.  For example, after an extended period at a high output 
equilibrium, the investment function would gradually shift downwards as perceived 
investment opportunities started to be exhausted.  A “high output” equilibrium embodying 
the equality of saving and investment would no longer be possible and there would then be 
a sudden shift downwards to a much lower equilibrium output.  This is an example of 
multiple equilibria, but with a sudden and explained shift and fast movement from one to 
another as the viability of the upper equilibrium vanishes.  It could be seen as an example of 
the famous quote often attributed to Rudi Dornbusch, “sometimes things take much longer 
than you thought they would, but then happen much faster than you thought they could.” 
 
 Expectations, confidence, animal spirits 
 For Keynes, the expectations, confidence and animal spirits of investors were fundamental 
to the willingness to commit to investment, for him the driver of aggregate demand.  He 
emphasised that they are very difficult to model formally but their key determinants and 
how they changed could be discussed explicitly.  For Hayek and Minsky there could be 
moments or episodes when they changed dramatically, and confidence in the workings of 
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the system could collapse.  “Animal spirits” are central to the explanation of the origins of 
the 2007/8 financial crisis offered by Akerlof and Shiller (2008).  They argue that this crisis, 
as so many previous crises, was shaped or determined by a period of overconfidence, 
followed by underconfidence.  They analyse how the first develops, how it is punctured and 
the swift collapse.  Again, this is real dynamics in the sense that I have defined.  The 
processes involved are not easy to capture in formal models, and none of the above authors 
did so, but they can nevertheless be traced in a fairly convincing way. 
 
 Innovation and entrepreneurship 
 Outstanding examples here are Schumpeter and Hirschman.  Schumpeter (1942): famously 
told his story of “creative destruction” and of waves of technological change in terms of 
monopolistic rents associated with special positions or technologies becoming targets for 
new ways of doing things, which “creatively” destroy the pre-existing condition and 
technologies.  Hirschman (1958), in his theory of unbalanced growth, also places 
entrepreneurship and the possibilities of “early profits” at centre stage, but this time in an 
environment of developing countries.  Hirschman’s argument was that public policy should, 
for example, encourage investment that creates a demand for an important input so that 
entrepreneurship, in scarce supply in this argument, is channelled into the supply of that 
input in the confidence that strong demand is there.  Again, we see examples of how 
changes occur, the importance of confidence and the processes that can generate them; in 
Hirschman’s case the implications for public policy were very explicit.  In Palanpur, a poor 
Indian village (see above), recognition of, and entrepreneurship in response to, changing 
opportunities in irrigation, new seed varieties and outside opportunities, have, in large 
measure, determined how and when lives and livelihoods have changed. 
 
 Endogenous growth and learning 
 Aghion et al. (2012 and 2014) have studied the learning in the process of investment, 
whereby both the investor and others learn from the experience of investment and from 
production.  A public policy example that they examine contains the question of how clean 
technologies can be encouraged so that the economy sets off down a path of cost-reduction 
and learning for clean technologies. 
 
 Investment, irreversibilities and sunk costs 
 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) focus on the possibility of irreversibilities and sunk costs as playing 
a crucial role in the timing of investment.  This is real dynamics in the sense that 
commitments involve outcomes that cannot easily be undone.  Again, history matters, and 
the making of one’s own history for the future by decisions now has a crucial influence on 
those decisions.  Very early in the discussion of irreversibilities in the economics of climate 
change, they give this example explicitly (Chapter 12.3 “The timing of environmental 
policy”). 
 
 Political economy 
 Entrenched positions can affect both the pace at which change is possible and the design of 
policy for that change.  When the European Trading System for carbon emissions was 
introduced it “grandfathered” emissions rights for existing firms by giving them free 
emissions permits equal to their original emissions.  It was argued that if they were forced 
to pay the full amount immediately, there would be costs of adjustment and political 
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opposition on a substantial scale.  Exxon Mobil and the Koch brothers, as Oreskes and her 
co-authors have argued (Oreskes and Supran, 2017; Oreskes and Conway, 2010), have 
invested considerable sums to try to prevent policy on climate change that they think would 
damage their interests.  The ability to move at the necessary pace for avoiding dangerous 
climate change has been directly influenced.  Some more climate policy issues follow in 
section 5.   
 
 Each of the six examples has been treated very briefly and through just one or two examples 
of research.  In each case, however, I hope enough has been said to show clearly how they 
can embody “real dynamics” of the kind I have defined. 
 
3. UNDERSTANDING OBJECTIVES 
 
 The standard criterion for evaluating outcomes in public economics is a social welfare 
function (SWF).  This is generally seen as a function of individual utility functions, which 
usually depend on a vector of own consumption.  From the intertemporal perspective, the 
vector of own consumption can include future consumption by an individual and the 
relevant households can include those occurring in the future.  Uncertainty is generally dealt 
with by taking expectations of the social welfare function (although short cuts such as extra 
discounting sometimes occur, see below in this section).  This approach via an SWF is 
sometimes call welfarism.  Utilitarianism (where utilities have some cardinal interpretation 
and the SWF is the sum of utilities) is a special case of welfarism.  
 
 However, this standard approach in public economics is not necessarily standard in public 
decision-making.  In that decision-making the setting of goals and targets is common.  That 
involves a discussion of the dimensions of concern (for example, elements of health or 
education) and an attempt to capture advance or regress on those dimensions through 
some form of calibration or measurement.  A key example internationally is the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) agreed at the UN in September 2015 and the Paris climate 
change agreement of December 2015 (again, more on these below). 
 
 Further, the standard public economics approach, or welfarism, is rather a narrow approach 
within a much broader set of perspectives around ethics or moral philosophy.  Welfarism is 
a special case of consequentialism, where actions or policies are judged solely in terms of 
their consequences, and various criteria can be brought to bear in relation to consequences.  
Tony Atkinson was much concerned with consequences for poverty and inequality but 
judgements over improvements on these dimensions do not necessarily derive from some 
overarching SWF of standard form (although in some cases and with some assumptions, 
they might be pressed into that form). 
 
 Beyond consequentialism there are several important ethical approaches in moral 
philosophy which have commanded wide attention. These include: contractarianism (for 
example, Rousseau, Rawls); Kantian approaches to moral imperatives; Aristotelian 
approaches to virtue; rights and liberties (for example, J.S. Mill, Isaiah Berlin); and others.  
They all have substance and potential traction in relation to public decision-making and 
structures. 
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 It is not possible here to provide an extensive discussion of key dynamic issues in relation to 
welfarism, targeting and broader ethical approaches.  However, there are some important 
conclusions from a discussion of objectives in relation to dynamic public policy, which I shall 
try to draw out.  We focus, in turn, on strategic targeting, discounting within the standard 
welfarism and, very briefly, broader approaches. 
 
 Strategic targeting 
 
 Governments often set targets or limits, such as maximum waiting times in accident and 
emergency rooms, or limits on alcohol in relation to driving or literacy and numeracy.  They 
may set targets or limits for aggregates such as air or water pollution.  The UK sets, under its 
climate change legislation, targets or budgets for aggregate GHG emissions for five-year 
periods at a time, within an overall target of reducing emissions by 80% between 1990 and 
2050.  A number of governments have set targets indicating that no hydrocarbon-powered 
vehicles can be sold after a certain date (including UK, India, France).  They may set 
expenditure targets such as 2% of national income on defence, or 0.7% on aid. 
 
 International agreements set first the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs agreed in 
2000) for 2015 and then (agreed in 2015) the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  The 
MDGs covered poverty, health, education, environment and gender issues.  They were an 
important influence on international development policy in the first two decades of this 
century.6  The SDGs apply to all countries and were agreed by all countries.7  They extend 
the dimensions of the MDGs with a strong emphasis on sustainability (including goals for 
forests, oceans, cities, infrastructure) and include inequality and international collaboration. 
 
 Targeting may be an intuitive attempt to distil “optimal paths” from an overall implicit SWF 
combined with an implicit model of what is feasible.  Making such modelling explicit rather 
than implicit could be helpful and have real value in trying to identify what targets “should 
be” and what are the key influences and assumptions influencing these conclusions.  But 
making these models explicit can be an elusive or impossible task.  Many of the 
relationships which are important may be difficult to capture, riddled with uncertainties, 
and refer to future changes which are unknown.  For many of the key processes, there may 
be very limited relevant data.  The inadequacy of our formal modelling capabilities for 
important issues where policy decisions cannot, or should not, be ducked may not inhibit 
people from “having a go”.  Perhaps they should.  But we should be keenly aware that such 
attempts may point in misleading directions, particularly when social welfare functions 
might be difficult to agree and the constraints on feasibility are difficult to capture.  
Nevertheless, from this perspective, targeting could be seen as an heuristic or short-cut 
approach to capturing key outcomes that could have emerged from an optimisation 
approach. 
 
 A second perspective (see, e.g., Besley and Coate, REFS) is to see the targeted objective as 
having overriding importance in social values.  Thus we might target “poverty reduction” as 
                                                          
6 When I was Chief Economist of the World Bank (2000-2003), we led the World Development Report with 
statistics on the MDGs, and they were the key subject of my regular reporting to the Development Committee 
of the World Bank. 
7 193 countries at the UN in September 2015. 
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our primary concern.  That is one position, understandable in some circumstances or 
perspectives, although it can have its tensions with Pareto or welfarist criteria (see, e.g., 
Kaplow and Shavell, REFS). 
 
 However, I do not think we can see all, or indeed most, examples of targeting either of these 
two ways.  Targeting can be a constructive way forward in taking political choices or 
indicating directions of change when there are conflicting perceptions of values and very 
uncertain economic or social structures; or indeed disagreements over the nature of the 
structures relevant for decision-making.  Thus, targets are often the result of political 
compromises and of attempts to navigate or overcome obstacles to change, in the face of 
major challenges or risks.  This is not necessarily an irrational approach, but rather a 
pragmatic and helpful response to visions of what should be done and how to get things 
done, where we seek a way forward but we vary in our values and analyses.  
 
 In such a context, decision-making is not optimisation by a single decision-maker in charge 
of the system he or she surveys.  Further, we may not be able to be very specific about the 
risks we are trying to manage.  Nevertheless, we may be able to understand enough to be 
clear that the potential risks are very large, enough to be clear that major efforts to avoid 
them are necessary, and enough to be clear on the basic sense of direction and initial 
actions that appear necessary and desirable. 
 
 Governments or groups might find it easier to agree on what are the key dimensions at issue 
(such as health or education as important elements of the MDGs and SDGs, or temperature 
in the case of the Paris COP21 agreement) than on the underlying values and modelling that 
might deliver some notion of an optimal policy.  And they then might be able to agree 
roughly where we should aim along those dimensions.  In these circumstances an attempt 
to force agreement on underlying values and models could undermine rather than facilitate 
agreement.  There is more on this in relation to climate in Sections 4 and 5.   
 
 It is interesting from this perspective that, in the Declaration of Independence, the founding 
fathers of the USA saw “the following truths to be self-evident”.  They did not try to offer 
some underlying ethical justification.  It is a very telling example of the idea that it is 
sometimes easier to agree on broad conclusions than on the detail of the arguments 
justifying those conclusions.  The potential difficulty in agreeing on reasons, or underlying 
arguments, is illustrated by pointing to the potential arguments that might justify the 
“truths” in the Declaration. John Locke, the key influence it seems, on Thomas Jefferson, the 
main drafter, appealed in his political philosophy to an underlying state of nature and law of 
nature, involving both a Christian theological foundation and a view of what it meant to be 
human.  Some have pointed to the influence on Jefferson of the moral philosophy of Francis 
Hutcheson and his doctrine of “moral sense, a faculty inherent in all human beings that no 
mere government could violate.” (Ellis, 1998, p.67).  For Bertrand Russell, writing in the mid-
20th century, the theological basis for the rights asserted by Locke was hard to accept.  He 
pointed to the possibility of a social contractarian basis for Locke’s natural rights (Russell, 
1961, pp.604-607).  Given an array of different possible foundations, the Founding Fathers 
might well have failed to agree on the argumentation for the truths, equalities and rights 
asserted.  But they found clear and strong agreement on the assertions themselves.  The 
dynamic consequences were profound. 
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 Discounting 
 
 How we value goods in the future in relation to goods now is clearly a quintessential 
intertemporal issue.  I will discuss it briefly here within the standard welfarist approach 
making five simple points.  They are basic and clear, in my view, but it is surprising how 
much of the economics literature on discounting, in the context of climate and elsewhere, 
has failed to grasp them. 
 
 As a useful reference point for the discussion of discounting, it may be helpful to have in 
front of us the Ramsey approach, after Frank Ramsey who in 1928 set out a formal 
mathematical analysis of savings choices.  He analysed the allocation of consumption in an 
infinite horizon model where the objective is maximisation of an intertemporal utility sum 
or integral, and income that is not consumed goes to capital accumulation.  He represented 
these choices as, in essence, balancing the cost of a consumption reduction now against the 
benefits the investment, which it enables, could bring.  This approach is so widely used in 
economics that we can think of it as a, or the, “standard” approach.  In my view, it can 
indeed provide one useful anchor or reference point for a discussion of discounting.  I 
should emphasise that I think that some of the underlying issues around intertemporal 
values and choices become still more clear if we think more generally and fundamentally, as 
I shall argue below.   
 
 I should be clear at the outset of this discussion of discounting that my concerns are not 
primarily with the standard model, but the way it has been used.  For example, value 
judgements are pushed into it without much discussion, or justification.  And data on 
market rates are imported into the discussions when a little thought would show they have 
little relevance. 
 
 In this Ramsey formulation in simple form, the marginal utility of consumption at a point in 
time should, on an optimum path, be equal to the marginal utility of consumption in the 
future that the investment from a consumption reduction at time t could generate.  We 
think of the marginal utility of consumption as representing the value of an extra unit of the 
commodity at time t.  If we normalise that value at unity for time zero then this value at 
time t is the discount factor, the relative value of a unit at time t in relation to a unit at time 
zero (see below).  In continuous time and after rearranging and taking time derivatives of 
this condition, we have that the rate of fall of the marginal utility of consumption, in other 
words (see below) the discount rate (the proportional rate of fall of the discount factor), on 
the path under examination at that point of time, should be equal to the rate of return on 
investment.  This is the Ramsey-rule.  Ramsey set it out for a single-consumer choice 
problem but it can be extended easily to a welfarist model of social optimisation, with a 
changing population, where social choices are across generations. 
 
 More formally, we can write the objective or maximand in a one-good, continuous-time 
model as ∫ 𝑁𝑢∞0 (𝐶 𝑁⁄ )𝑒−𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡, 
 where C is aggregate consumption, N is population, C/N is consumption per head and δ is a 
pure-time discount rate (see below).  The marginal utility of consumption is u’e-δt (the 
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partial derivative of the maximand with respect to C).  The discount rate, at a given point in 
time, or rate of fall of the marginal utility of consumption at that time, becomes, where 𝑢′̇  is 
the time derivative of 𝑢′, (− 𝑢′̇ 𝑢′)⁄ +  𝛿. 
 The Ramsey rule in this type of model is that this should be equal to the marginal product of 
capital (f’(k) in the case of a constant returns to scale production function where output per 
head is f(k) a function of capital per head).  Our focus here is on discounting. 
 
 In this very simple case it is clear that the strength of discounting is given by the 
combination of two terms.  The first depends on how rapidly consumption per head is 
changing, together with the form of utility function, u( ).  If future generations are richer on 
a given path at time t than now, we may choose to assign a lower value to an increment to 
their consumption at time relative to such an increase now.  The second (δ) depends on 
how strongly one chooses to discount a future life irrespective of the consumption it might 
embody; if δ>0, we are assigning (via e-δt in the maximand) a lower value to a person simply 
because of the date of birth.  Both elements clearly involve value judgements.  The first also 
involves the rate of change of consumption, which depends on choices, constraints et 
cetera. 
 
 In this formulation, as noted, we would likely regard future increments to consumption as 
less valuable if future generations are richer, but we must emphasise that whether they are 
richer or not will depend on a whole range of choices; with unmanaged climate change, they 
may be poorer.  Obviously, because they depend on levels and ratios of change of 
consumption, the discount factors and rates along a path are endogenous to the choices 
shaping the path. 
 
 This simple formulation is helpful as a first cut at thinking about consumption allocation in 
the context of welfare across generations.  It is a formal representation of how to balance 
increments across generations.  Its implications will depend on further assumptions, 
including on the structure of production and technical progress.  A current generation, 
dictating on behalf of future generations, might choose to give up an extra unit of 
consumption for the benefit of future generations if, via the production process, the benefit 
is ‘seen to be’ sufficiently large.  From the point of view of the analysis of inequality and 
intertemporal allocation across generations from a welfarist perspective of social choices, it 
describes one way of thinking about the “right amount” of inequality across generations.  In 
this very simple case, if we assume capital is productive, the “right” answer to this ethical 
question is a consumption path that rises over time, taking advantage of the productivity of 
capital.  This very simple case illustrates some of the arguments which follow.  But the issues 
are more clear, in my view, if we express ourselves more generally and go back to the 
fundamentals and definitions. 
 
 (i)  Discounting: be clear on basic concept 
 The value of an increment in a good in the future, relative to an increment now, is the 
discount factor () for that good at that time.  The proportionate rate of fall of the discount 
factor (­̇/) is the discount rate for that good at that time; it clearly depends on both the 
good and the time.  The primary focus in evaluations should be on the discount factor, as 
that is the relative valuation or key relative price at issue for valuing costs and benefits 
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occurring in the future, relative to now.  That is the subject at issue in the evaluation of a 
stream of costs and benefits. 
 
 Starting with the right concept for the question at hand, here the discount factor, makes it 
immediately clear that it will depend on the state of affairs at the time t in the future.  
Unmanaged climate change could make the future very poor.  In such circumstances we 
might place a very high value on extra goods at that time; in other words, there would be 
negative discounting in the sense that the discount factor would be greater than one.  This 
argument makes clear also that the state of nature that could occur is of critical relevance.  
So, too, is the person or persons to whom increments may occur.  Understanding the 
discounting concept properly makes it clear that using the language of “the discount rate” 
as if there is one given rate is a serious misunderstanding of the basic issues: it is, indeed, a 
mistake. 
 
 (ii)  Discounting is endogenous 
 This approach makes it very clear that discounting (and the “discount rate”) is endogenous 
to our decisions and that endogeneity is potentially fierce in the case of climate change.  A 
discount rate cannot simply be imported as exogenous and outside the model.  This is 
illustrated in the Ramsey formulation above.  The level and rate of change of consumption 
at each point of time is part of the choice.  Thus discounting is shaped by that choice.  If we 
are on a path with rapidly rising consumption then discounting would likely be strong and an 
increment of consumption to those in the future would have considerably less value than an 
increment now.  But bad policies in relation to climate change could lead those in the future 
to be much worse off than now. 
 
 (iii)  Separate discounting from the treatment of uncertainty 
 Within the welfarist approach, uncertainty is most straightforwardly treated by making it 
explicit and building it into objective functions by, for example, taking expectations of a 
social welfare function (SWF) across different possible states.  Adding something to the 
discount rate is valid as a short-cut only in a very special case where “the end of the world” 
is the first event in a Poisson process, and the SWF is a sum of future utilities; in that case, 
the weight on utility in a period in the future is the probability, exp(-t) of survival up to that 
point, where  is the Poisson parameter.   
 
 (iv)  The weakness of the case for “pure-time discounting” 
 The issues of pure-time discounting can arrive when considering how to value a life in the 
future.  It is essentially defined as, attaching a lower weight to a life in the future, which is 
otherwise identical to a life now, except that it is in the future.  If the pure-time discount 
rate were 2% per annum for example, then a life starting 35 years in the future, but 
otherwise identical to a life now, has a value of one-half that of a life now.  In this sense it is 
discrimination by date of birth.  It cannot be justified by some notion of the future being 
better off than now; that would be a separate issue, we are assuming here for the purposes 
of ethical comparison that the two lives are identical, except for birth date.  It is very 
difficult to find serious ethical arguments for this kind of discrimination. 
 
 One argument that we see in (iii) above is the probability of existence.  But that could justify 
only a rather small discount rate.  A mere 50% probability of survival for the world and its 
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population for 35 years, as in the example of the preceding paragraph, would seem 
implausibly low.  And in any case, that form of discounting is just shorthand for capturing 
one particular form of uncertainty and is not, as such, an ethical position.  The underlying 
ethical position would be the utilitarian sum of utilities adjusted for the probability of 
survival, and the exponential form models the probability of survival. 
 
 Arrow et al ( 2013) have raised an issue concerning whether or not the absence of pure-time 
discounting would give rise to very high savings rates or, indeed, savings rates close to or at 
100% in some optimal savings models. This assumption, it is suggested, would lead to 
conclusions that would appear to be very odd or unacceptable.  Essentially the result arises 
because it would seem attractive to push consumption off into the future because there is 
no discounting of future utility and we might, in this model, get a positive return on a delay 
of consumption.  But, in my view, this argument is unpersuasive.  The “unpleasant” 
conclusion arises in one class of models with a number of embodied assumptions.  It is a 
mistake to attribute the “perceived peculiarity” of the conclusion about high saving entirely 
to one specific assumption.  In such models of optimal savings, the “peculiar conclusion” 
goes away if, for example, technical progress is introduced.  Thus, one could argue that the 
peculiarity is the consequence of an absence of technological progress.  When results are 
very sensitive to many elements of a special model it is unconvincing to “point the finger” at 
one particular assumption as the “culprit”.  It is especially troubling when that is then used 
to try to make an otherwise dubious ethical argument.  Introducing pure-time discounting is 
an ethical statement with substantial consequences and with little in the way of foundations 
in ethics or moral philosophy.  Such a strong assumption with dubious ethical validity cannot 
stand on one particular, and in my view misleading, interpretation of the workings of one 
particular type of savings model. 
 
 There is a related argument based on the work of Koopmans (1960) and Diamond (1965) 
which indicates that equal treatment across time is inconsistent with a complete Paretian 
ordering.  The problem is similar in the sense that with the criterion of equal treatment we 
have potentially divergent future utility integrals and incomplete orderings.  As Diamond 
makes clear (see Stern, 2015, p.169) that result, based fundamentally on infinite horizons, is 
not a reason for introducing an otherwise unacceptably discriminatory criterion into the 
real-world finite horizon choices we must make.  
 
 Value judgements are value judgements, but that does not mean that rational arguments 
cannot or should not be brought to the table.  Pure assertion is not enough.  Such rational 
arguments are largely absent, in my view, in any serious justification of pure-time 
discounting.  For further discussion, see Stern (2015, Chapter 5). 
 
 (v)  Discount rates for ethical evaluations cannot be read off from markets 
 Market prices and interest rates, or rates of return, do not give us ethical evaluations – they 
are outcomes (equilibrium or otherwise) of the individual choices of many players.  They do 
not even give individual marginal valuations where there are many market imperfections.  
And where there are many imperfections and many markets, there will be many market 
prices.  This is simply not a viable route to the social evaluations that are necessary here. 
 
 Beyond welfarism 
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 The welfarist approach of most public economics is just one way of looking at the ethics of 
public and private decision-making.  There are several other approaches which command 
attention.  These include the approaches of contractarianism, Kant, Aristotle, rights and 
liberty, and others.  This is not the place for a detailed discussion; some elements of such a 
discussion are provided in Stern (2015, Chapter 6 and Stern, 2014). 
 
 We note simply here that all four of these perspectives or approaches that go beyond 
welfarism would seem to point to strong action on climate change.  A contractarian 
approach would likely see riding roughshod over future lives by refusing to manage climate 
change as outside a reasonable or acceptable social contract.  A Kantian categorical 
imperative is to behave as you would have others behave, and that would likely involve 
respecting the livelihoods of others.  Similarly, a notion of virtue would likely exclude serious 
damage to the lives of others in pursuit of narrow self-interest.  A rights approach would 
surely involve respect for the rights of future generation.  These arguments are elaborated 
in Chapter 6 of Stern (2015) and in Stern (2014), which also provide references to further 
discussion of these perspectives.   
 
 Finally, we should emphasise that the issues of values loom so strongly in climate change 
that we must examine them directly.  The value judgements are of such direct importance 
that they must be discussed and scrutinised directly.  They cannot be reached down from 
some shelf without discussion or examination. 
 
 This section has been, in some ways, a bridge between the fairly general discussion of public 
economics and one specific but important example, climate change.  For both the general 
and specific discussions, intertemporal values are at centre stage and explicit and careful 
discussion is crucial.  Sadly, such discussion is often absent, implicit or careless. 
 
4. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE MODELLING 
 
Growth and technical progress, risk, and environment have long been rich and productive 
elements of our discipline and all three have been part of public economics.  Generally, of 
course not always, the three areas are analysed separately in order to focus.  But climate 
change inevitably involves all three and a dynamic public economics relevant to climate 
change must embody all three.  It should be clear at the outset that attempting to handle all 
three in one overall model carries the dangers of oversimplifying on each of the three 
elements to the point where the overarching model is grossly misleading. 
 
Unfortunately, that is what has happened in the standard modelling of climate change in the 
“Integrated Assessment Models” (IAMs) which have played a dominant role from the 
beginning of this literature and the early work of Cline (1992) and Nordhaus (1991) about a 
quarter of a century ago.  That initial modelling was of real value but the subject has got 
stuck with a standard framework which, far from capturing the key elements of the story, 
actually leaves them out.  On the damage side, in the standard framework, there is 
systematic and gross underestimation of risks from unmanaged climate change.  And, on 
the action and opportunity side, it generally fails to describe both the potential lock-in 
effects of bad investment (via long-lasting high-carbon infrastructure, for example) and the 
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great potential from fostering and investing in changing technology and economic 
organisation. 
 
A standard IAM has a simple underlying growth story with, in many cases, an exogenous 
growth or savings rate.  In the models, economic activity involves emissions which cumulate 
and cause temperature increase.  In these models the effects of temperature increase are 
generally to damage only current output, and nothing else.  Risk is treated in a summary 
way, often simply by putting in expected values (or mean equivalents).  Outputs can be 
consumed, invested or spent on reducing emissions to mitigate climate change.  There are 
production relationships describing the generation of output and the costs of reducing 
emissions.  These models try to pose and to address the question of how much to divert 
potential investment that could increase output towards emissions reduction, that is to 
mitigation of climate change.  Thus the title of Nordhaus’ important and early piece (1992) 
was, “To slow or not to slow”. 
 
In attempting to build a model of growth, risk and environment, the modellers have been 
well-intentioned.  But in doing so, they have so simplified each element as to, in large 
measure, render the models incapable of addressing the real questions that face us.  Risks 
are portrayed as modest, affecting only current outputs and with no structural impacts on 
underlying growth. The technology in the standard framework for reducing emissions 
involves little or no learning and has diminishing returns to scale, thus rising marginal costs 
of action.  What has happened in this approach to modelling is essentially an attempt to 
shoe-horn a new and immense problem into a narrow and familiar structure (essentially 
marginal perturbations within a standard growth model) using standard tools.  It has not 
worked. 
 
When facing an issue with risks of a potential magnitude very different from what we have 
experienced hitherto, we should begin with an attempt to understand the drivers of the 
problem, the science.  And we must also think deeply about scale and dynamics in analysing 
potential responses, and here technology and economic organisation are fundamental.  We 
comment briefly on the risks and the technologies in relation to past modelling attempts 
and to potential ways forward. 
 
The form of the impact of climate change in standard IAM models is only usually via a 
multiplier on current output which depends on current temperature.8  There is no structural 
effect on growth rates – and no damage to capital.  We have not seen 3°C for 3 million years 
and 4° or 5°C for tens of millions of years.  On current paths there are serious risks of such 
temperatures over the next century or so.  Many areas would be submerged, others 
desertified, others battered by hurricanes and storms way beyond the intensity we now see.  
Hundreds of millions, possibly billions, of people would have to move.  Such transformations 
would surely involve radical change in what growth is possible and devastating damage to 
physical, natural, human and social capital.  We cannot be precise about exactly when and 
where this could happen but climate science and climate history tells us that these risks are 
potentially immense and real and that it would be reckless to act as if those risks are small.  
The nature and magnitude of these risks is what drives rational concern about climate, 
                                                          
8 Sometimes a non-multiplicative form is used, but generally the modelling of output loss is a function of 
current temperature and current output. 
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based on the science, but the economic models largely leave out key risks that the science 
suggests are possible (i.e. disturbance or destruction of growth and capital, mass population 
movement and so on).  Many scientists are deeply puzzled, indeed very anxious, about such 
modelling and the complacency it appears to generate amongst some economists in relation 
to appropriate action. 
 
It is not just the structural defects and omissions of risks in the modelling as just described 
that are troubling.  It is also the assumed magnitude of damages built into the economic 
models.  Most models have damages from a 4°or 5°C increase around 5 or 10% of current 
output (see Nordhaus, 2013). Some Nordhaus models have only a 50% drop in output at 
18°C temperature increase.  Human life would likely be extinguished on the planet at far 
lower temperatures than that.  Many models, for example Tol (2012), have damages far less 
than this. 
 
These numbers in these models are just astonishingly small in the context of climate history.  
Such temperatures, 4 or 5°C and upwards, not experienced probably for 30 or more million 
years, would involve a planet very different from the one we now see; they could arrive in 
the next century or so, extremely rapidly in terms of climate history.  Lives and livelihoods 
would likely be destroyed across the globe.  We do not know how to model such transitions 
and transformations very precisely: they are so far beyond human experience.  But an 
estimate of damages in terms of a potential loss of 5 or 10% of output seems to be 
extraordinarily small.  For example, the carrying capacity of population on the planet could 
likely be far lower than the 10 billion or so anticipated in standard demographic projections 
over a century or more (United Nations Environment Programme, 2012).  We are potentially 
speaking of loss of life on a very large scale.  
 
These formulations generally arise from grossly simplistic econometrics or applied 
economics.  Broadly speaking, there have been two “econometric” routes in the literature, 
neither of which makes much sense.  I simplify here, but most attempts to “calibrate 
damages” fit into one of these forms in terms of basic approach (or some combination).  The 
“intertemporal estimation” route looks back over the experience since temperatures started 
increasing with the strong build-up of hydrocarbon-fuelled growth; this period is mostly 
post-Second World War.  Temperature ranges might be 0°-1°C or 0.5°-1°C.  It is very hard to 
argue that there is information in temperatures over that range which can help us in 
understanding increases of 3°, 4° or 5°C.  It is only by extrapolation in a structure where the 
functional form for the extrapolation plays an overwhelming role that can one use 0-1°C as a 
basis for estimating impacts for 3-5°C.  But it is surely implausible that experience over 0-1°C 
can tell us very much about the curvature of the functional form that is so critical to such 
extrapolations.  We have to look elsewhere for the relevant evidence, in part in the very 
long-term climate history that can provide some guidance as to what a 3-5°C world might 
look like.  But beyond that we also have to think of the potential traumas of the transition; 
this is climate change at an historically rapid rate and not just a comparison between 
equilibria at different global temperature. 
 
The second way of estimating, tried by some of those thinking about quantifying potential 
climate damages, is to compare productivity or welfare in places at different temperatures; 
that is a cross-section approach.  But that is also deeply implausible as a method of 
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capturing global effects in the sense that the difference in temperature between, say, 
Stockholm and Madrid is a very different matter from a major global temperature increase.  
Damage from climate change is mostly about water, or its absence, in some shape or form: 
storms, floods, droughts, sea-level rise, and so on.  These effects involve the functioning of 
the global climate systems as a whole, and local climate impacts from such global 
temperature increase are very poorly captured by local temperatures.  The examples of 
hurricanes and tropical storms, or the potential desertification of southern Europe, illustrate 
the point. 
 
The first econometric approach involves, as argued above, grossly misleading projecting 
outside sample.  The second attempts to link contemporaneous temperature difference 
within a given global climate to the different global climates that could arise with different 
and much higher temperatures in the future.  That is to misunderstand climate science and 
the meaning of global climate change.  Neither approach constitutes use of evidence that is 
remotely plausible.  Having said that, the second approach carries some interest, for 
example, on adaptation to temperature difference at different locations.  But is does not tell 
us much about global climate change. 
 
This is not, of course, an argument against the use of evidence.  It is an argument against 
the use of evidence that is based on data with only a minimal or spurious relevance to the 
problem at hand.  More relevant is the long-run evidence on the state of the world when it 
was, say, 3 or 4  ֯  Centigrade higher than now, perhaps 3 million or tens of millions years 
ago.  Or higher temperatures when we have to go back many tens of millions of years.  
However, we do know many relevant things from these data, including sea levels (tens of 
metres higher than now), where deserts were, or were not, and where mammals could live, 
and so on.  Enough to be clear that there would be radical change in populations that could 
be supported and where they could live.  We know major climate change has produced 
major extinctions.   
 
We also know something of the physics of the strength of hurricanes and sea temperatures 
and the consequences of more intense hurricanes.  We can try to model the consequences 
for river flows, of radical changes in snows and glaciers of the Himalayas or the Andes.  
There is much evidence that we can use which does offer insight into global risks.   
 
This is the relevant evidence and it suggests the real possibility of catastrophic damage to 
human well-being.  It is simply not reflected in the models.9  Some research is beginning to 
emerge which is more analytically relevant and serious on quantifying possible damages 
(see, for example, the work of Michael Greenstone at the Climate Lab in Chicago, and 
Ottmar Edenhofer at the Potsdam Institute). 
 
The modelling of the production side in most IAMs is also deeply troubling.  We have seen 
immense advances in technology and learning in the relatively short period when we have 
begun to focus on the practicalities of a transition to low or zero-carbon growth.  The price 
of a solar panel has fallen by a factor of 10 or more in a decade.  Costs have fallen rapidly in 
on-shore and off-shore wind.  There have been great advances in storage of energy.  There 
                                                          
9 See also Pindyck, 2013, on the lack of credibility of this type of climate modelling. 
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are likely more on the way in renewables and storage.  In the last decade, there have been 
huge advances in hybrid and electric cars to the point that there is recognition by car 
makers and policy makers that the era of mass sales of vehicles incorporating the internal 
combustion engine has only 2 or 3 decades further to run.  The digital and artificial 
intelligence management of energy demand and supply has enormous potential, and is 
moving very rapidly.  So, too, the transmission networks and linking of grids.  We can now 
see the tremendous potential in organising our cities in ways that enable us to move, 
breathe, and prosper.  The potential in energy and resource efficiency and productivity is 
immense; there have been many advances and there are more on the way.  We are learning 
much more about capturing carbon in soils and forests and making progress in methods for 
direct capture of carbon and its use or storage.  We will have to understand much more 
about managing and protecting oceans but again work is underway. 
 
This is an area where we can now see the huge potential of dynamic increasing returns in 
technological change, and the potentially huge returns from better physical and economic 
design and organisation.  By making something a priority, such as efficiency or low-carbon, 
by public discussion, by pricing and taxing, by regulating, by R and D investment, by city 
planning or land management, and so on, we can generate remarkable technical creativity 
and progress.  And we learn enormously along the way.  A key task of dynamic public 
economics is to understand how to foster such processes.  We should be very clear that 
static cost functions with diminishing returns to scale and rising marginal costs are grossly 
misleading, in the contexts of the cost structures we have been describing and on how they 
are changing. 
 
There is another fundamental technological issue, on both the production and consumption 
sides of economic activity, and that is “lock-in”.  Infrastructure and capital, once invested, 
‘lock-in’ the use of key inputs, in particular hydrocarbons.  The capital can last for many 
decades – for example, coal-fired power stations.  The same is true of, although often for 
only a decade or two, of consumer durables, such as cars.  Thus there can be major costs of 
delay. 
 
This is not the place to further develop these arguments on the failures of IAMs, the most 
prominent tool in the economics of climate change; for an elaboration, see Stern 2015, 
Chapter 4.  The purpose here has been to show what is involved in the modelling side of a 
dynamic public economics.  The dynamics here are of a fundamental kind.  Damages from 
unmanaged climate change are potentially immense, result from an integral of emissions, 
occur across the whole economic and physical system and, in many ways, are potentially 
long-lasting or irreversible.  The economic response has to be very large, involve dynamic 
increasing returns, changed economic and urban organisation and design, and the 
avoidance of potential lock-ins.  Yet we have seen models predominate where these 
elements, the guts of the story, are essentially assumed away.  That cannot be a dynamic 
public economics of the kind the problem demands. 
 
We need a new generation of economic models which do embody the characteristics we 
have described.  Given the nature and subtleties of each element, it is unlikely to be a good 
analytical or modelling strategy to try to build them all into one grand model.  But we can 
model dynamic increasing returns (see, for example, Aghion et al 2014) and we can model 
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irreversibility in investment in the context of uncertainty (see, for example, Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994).  We have the beginnings of the modelling of extreme risk in the work of 
Weitzman (2011).  Thus, we can see the beginnings of very good theory, or sets of theories 
and models, which capture key elements.  We need more of it. 
 
At the same time, we have to make policy, now.  We have seen that the next twenty years 
are decisive (Section 1) and that delay is dangerous.  Thus we need to think how to make 
best use of what we now know, or think we know or understand.  We need an applied 
economics of policy that puts argument and perspectives together based on current 
understandings, models, theories, evidence and judgement.  Decisions now should provide 
structural guidance at the same time as we invest further in empirical and theoretical 
understanding. 
 
To illustrate, let me point to the work on the New Climate Economy from the Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate which I co-chair.  We showed in our work, “Better 
Growth, Better Climate” (2014) and in “The Sustainable Infrastructure Imperative” (2016) 
how a well-designed transition to a low or zero-carbon economy could proceed over the 
next two decades.  We showed that we could indeed generate both better growth and 
better climate and that sustainable infrastructure was at its core.  The better growth comes 
from a much less polluted and congested form of living, particularly in our cities, and from a 
much less destructive approach to our land, forests and oceans.  It can be growth that is 
strong, sustainable and much more attractive.  It will involve radical change in the way we 
foster and finance infrastructure.  Meeting the Paris COP21 targets of “well-below 2°C” 
involves almost all infrastructure investment being sustainable from now on.  That in turn 
requires good economic policy and well-structured finance.  It is to policy that we now turn. 
 
5. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE POLICIES 
 
 A dynamic public economics for climate change must set policies in the context of a strategy 
that takes careful account of the medium and longer term and associated risks and of the 
urgency of the necessary action; it must examine prices and incentives; and it must describe 
how sustainable investment can be fostered and financed.  We take these three in turn.  We 
then comment briefly on the principles, practicalities and dynamics of the formation of 
international agreements and objectives for responding to a challenge that embodies what 
is quintessentially a global public good and, in particular, on the important example of the 
construction of the Paris agreement at UNFCCC COP21, Paris, December 2015 and on the 
delivery of the agenda it set. 
 
 Strategy and policy 
 
 We have described global strategic objectives in terms of the Paris target of well below 2C 
and the UN SDGs.  For a country such as the UK, the broad strategic objective10 is to cut 
emissions by 80% between 1990 and 2050.  Policies are then designed to pursue those 
                                                          
10 That objective was specified, prior to Paris COP21 in 2015, in relation to a global objective of holding 
temperature increases below 2  ֯ C.  “Well below 2  ֯ C” the Paris objective requires stronger action.  Net zero 
within 50 years or so (as in the Paris agreement) is now more appropriate, where net zero is more accurately 
described in the Paris language of balancing sources and sinks. 
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strategic objectives within the context of some understanding of strategy for action based 
on the strategic objectives.  The point I want to emphasise here is that the detail of policies 
cannot be set out without the context of an overall strategy.  At one level this is another 
formulation of the familiar observation in economics, that the prices reflecting marginal 
costs or benefits cannot be described until we know roughly where we are planning to be.  I 
do not want to discuss here the detail of the strategies that could emerge from some of the 
principles articulated below.  My key point is simply that strategy is necessary to anchor 
policy specifics and for precision about policy.    
 
 One example will illustrate.  The Stern-Stiglitz Commission (see report, May 2017) was asked 
to indicate ranges and paths of carbon prices which, appropriately combined with other 
policies could deliver on the Paris target.  The strategy provided the context in which price 
policy could be developed.  That price path is not some estimate of the evolution of social 
marginal damage, it is a price path that can guide change at the necessary scale and pace.  
And it has to take into account the need to induce rapid technical innovation as well as 
investment of the necessary type and scale. 
 
 A key principle for guiding strategy in the context of climate change must be the importance 
of integrating mitigation, adaptation and development.  These three elements are 
sometimes described as alternatives or, in some sense in competition for priorities or 
resources.  They should be seen as interwoven strands.  There are many examples.  Let me 
give just one.  The SRI11 approach to rice involves different spacings and planting depths, 
and avoids the flooding of the paddy fields both elements in contrast to hitherto standard 
methods..  It saves on water and energy and thus constitutes more efficient development.  
It avoids the emission of methane from flooded fields, and is thus contributing to mitigation.  
And it is more robust to difficult weather conditions, in other words, more resilient; that is 
adaptation.  Many more examples could be offered from energy, buildings, transport, and 
so on.  It is thus a basic mistake to separate these three issues, whether in analysis or in 
funding or in organisation.   
 
 A further basic principle is the importance of credibility, clarity and coherence in policy.  
Government-induced policy risk is arguably the biggest threat to investment of any kind, be 
it sustainable or otherwise.  Sometimes clear and strong legislation and institutions can 
contribute the necessary confidence behind strong investment.  Examples could include the 
UK climate change legislation or the embodiment of climate targets in China’s five-year 
plans.   
 
 In designing strategy we should recognise that it should give some account of the basic mix 
of instruments, including regulation and quantity criteria, prices and taxes, and public 
investment; and the kind of institutional arrangements which might enhance credibility.   
 
 Market failures 
 
 In Stern (2007), we described emissions of greenhouse gases as the greatest market failure 
the world has ever seen.  This is because the consequences are so large and we are all 
                                                          
11 System of root intensification. 
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involved in both the causes and the effects.  But a dynamic public economics in relation to 
climate change must recognise five further and crucial market failures.  Whilst of crucial 
importance to climate change they are often of great relevance in many other public policy 
issues.  The failures concern (i) research and development, (ii) imperfections in risk and 
capital markets (iii) networks, such as public transport grids, broadband and recycling, (iv) 
information available to producers and consumers, for example about the efficiency 
performance of capital equipment and the availability of different options, (v) co-benefits of 
action on climate, in particular concerning air, water and land pollution.  All five involve 
powerful dynamic elements, as does the fundamental GHG externality. 
 
 There is much to say on all six of these market failures (the GHG externality plus the five 
listed above).  Space prevents us from going in to great detail, but I hope that this brief 
description of what they are makes it clear that the policies for a sustainable dynamics of 
investment and consumption choices require attention to all six.  It is simply not enough to 
fix the GHG externality through some carbon tax or price, or appropriate regulation and to 
assert that perfect and complete markets and vibrant entrepreneurship will take care of the 
rest.  The GHG externality is indeed fundamental and is the first of our market failures, but 
we have to handle all six. 
 
 Shaping investment 
 
 Infrastructure investment is at the core of both achieving the Paris objectives and of 
delivering on the SDGs.  Infrastructure investment is for the long term and generally 
involves a mix of public and private action and finance.  Infrastructure investment in the 
world is a little over 3 trillion dollars a year now, and will likely rise to 6 or 7, or more, in the 
next twenty years.  How that investment takes place will, in large measure, determine 
whether we have any chance of holding to 2°C.  If we lock in high-carbon infrastructure over 
the next 20 years, then the chance of holding to 2°C will be gone, and indeed 3°C might be 
very difficult.   
 
 Policies and institutions as sketched above will be crucial to generating investment demand.  
There is plenty of saving in the world and many potential investment opportunities.  But 
what is missing is the set of policies and institutions that can translate opportunity into real 
demand.   
 
 Further, investment demand has to be financed.  Infrastructure projects can be very risky, 
particularly at the early stages.  Good policies will reduce the risk, but cannot take it away.   
Development banks can play a major role in managing and reducing that risk still further.  
Their presence itself gives confidence about future policy.  Further, they can bring a mix of 
instruments to the table, including equity, long-term loans and guarantees that can help get 
through these early stages.  If that is successful, there is a great deal of private money that is 
available.  They can be trusted convenors for drawing together partnerships and the 
blending of public and private finance. 
 
 In Bhattacharya et al (2016) we discuss, at some length, some quantitative and qualitative 
elements of the challenge of creating the necessary sustainable infrastructure and the 
possible policies and financial instruments and structures in the response to the challenge.  
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This includes a large possible expansion of the role of multilateral development banks in 
fostering good policy and investment, and in managing risk and finance. 
 
 The formation of international objectives 
 
 The challenges of climate change are quintessentially those of a global public good.  The 
driving force is the sum total, the overall concentrations, of GHGs in the atmosphere, 
irrespective of whether they come from London or Johannesburg, Chicago or Beijing, 
Munich or Delhi.  Hence a coherent world policy requires common understanding and some 
shared objectives.  A simple-minded economist’s response to issues of collaboration would 
often be pessimistic with the statement that we have a “free-rider problem”: let others 
make the reductions, we will not incur the costs ourselves.  It is very interesting, indeed 
remarkable, that the world did get together to set an international target in Paris in 
December 2015 at COP21 of the UNFCCC and to set out basic mechanisms towards its 
achievement. It is a crucially important illustration of how people and communities can 
come to shared decisions and I comment briefly on how it came about and its lessons for 
dynamic public policy. 
 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been working since 1988 to 
build a shared scientific understanding.  It has had its difficulties and because it is a 
government-based group it tends to try to come to agreement on the state of science and 
analysis by finding bland statements and lowest common denominators.  That can be 
problematic when extreme risks are of the essence.  Nevertheless, it has helped to provide a 
broad foundation, with 30 years of substantial agreement over the scientific evidence on 
the risks.  That is one key element of the foundations of the Paris agreement.  And the 
evidence is that, as time goes by and still more evidence accumulates, the risks look ever-
more troubling. 
 
 A second key foundation of the Paris agreement was a growing understanding of the 
feasibility and attractiveness of low- or zero-carbon growth.  The costs of energy 
alternatives to hydrocarbons have plummeted. We are seeing ever-stronger evidence of the 
costs and dangers of air, water and soil pollution from burning hydrocarbons.  And we are 
understanding much better how to shape and manage our energy, transport, cities and 
infrastructure in much more efficient and less-polluting ways.  We recognise much more 
clearly, how we can rehabilitate agricultural land, forests and ecosystems to our great 
benefit.  And we see growing evidence of the costs of damaging our oceans. 
 
 This second area of understanding, on the feasibility and attractiveness of alternative paths 
to the high-carbon one, was critical to the success of COP21 in Paris.  One contribution was 
the Better Growth, Better Climate report12 of 2014, but still more important was the direct 
experience of countries, both of the costs of pollution from burning hydrocarbons, and of 
the feasibility of different paths. 
 
 There were other important features to shaping the dynamics of understanding and the 
willingness to collaborate.  One of these was the recognition that the absence of formal 
                                                          
12 This was from the Global Commission on Economy and Climate, which I co-chair, and its programme of work 
on the New Climate Economy. 
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enforcement mechanisms and binding constraints could lead to greater ambition and 
achievement.  Countries and peoples do take their commitments seriously, but are 
understandably reluctant to put themselves at risk of sanctions from others.  They will agree 
to some degree of mutual scrutiny, but not necessarily to mutual punishment. 
 
 If we compare COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen, which was fractious and had limited (but not 
negligible) achievement, with COP21 in 2015 in Paris, I think the above elements were 
crucial in driving change and agreement.  From analysis and experience we can learn how to 
collaborate.  That is a key lesson and challenge for a dynamic public economics.  We learn, 
too, that the narrow-minded, self-interested model of human behaviour which many 
economists are so fond, is not always an accurate description of the attitudes of 
government and peoples to the management of major and global risks.  People recognise 
and are concerned with the consequences of their actions for others.  The depth of the 
understanding and the willingness to act will depend on context, language, communication 
and the reality of options; and on leadership.13  Understanding these processes should be a 
crucial element of a dynamic public economics. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
 The paper, inspired by conversations and collaboration with Tony Atkinson, and drawing on 
extensive experience of analysis and policy-making on climate change, has tried to argue the 
importance of building a new dynamic public economics.  This is an economics that goes 
beyond simply dating goods by the time at which they appear.  It goes beyond portraying 
growth using a simple growth model, which often embodies a strong focus on long-run 
steady states.  It goes beyond the evaluation of policy via the marginal perturbations it 
might generate.  It looks at the drivers, processes and pace of change.  That is public 
economics as if time matters.   
 
 Many examples have been offered from climate change.  We have to learn to understand, 
model and garner evidence on great risks, possibly existential for many.  These could involve 
irreversibilities and destruction on a grand scale.  We must recognise that the pace of 
change is intensely important.  If path A gets to low emissions 20 years later than path B, 
then the costs of the accumulated extra emissions could be immense.  Pace really does 
matter. 
 
 Avoiding radical risk involves, in this example, radical and rapid change.  We have to think 
clearly, but also quickly, how to manage the change and how public support can emerge, 
and indeed drive and shape change.  That is true across countries as well as within.  There 
are issues around equity, intratemporally as well as intertemporally, as Tony emphasised so 
strongly.  Some of these, but not all, can be resolved by finding ways forward where many 
gain.  Sharing of ideas and help with resources can be a vital part of this story.  Those who 
are poor now will seek paths which are much cleaner and more sustainable than those of 
people who become richer earlier, both because there are now attractive options available, 
which can be inclusive as well as sustainable, and because they are concerned about 
                                                          
13 For example, President Barack Obama and Xi Jinping announced their own country targets for emissions 
reductions, together in Beijing in November 2014, one year before Paris, COP21. 
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consequences for succeeding generations.  That is a process from which most can gain and 
which all should support.  Finding ways to do this is part of a dynamic public economics. 
 
 I have tried to point to the dynamic public economics that we already have.  There are 
indeed some valuable theoretical investigations available to us already.  Examples offered 
above include the work of Aghion and others on public policy with dirty goods and 
endogenous growth, of Dixit and Pindyck on irreversibilties and investment around 
environmental action, and the work of Weitzman on extreme risk.  At the same time, I have 
emphasised the severe limitations, indeed the misleading models and stories of current 
Integrated Assessment Models, which have been influential in the economics literature on 
climate change.  It is time for a new generation of models.   
 
 We should not expect to get helpful results by building one grand model.  I do not think that 
is a sensible way forward in the building of understanding and of good policy (although, of 
course, if some wish to try, that is their privilege.  Good policy-makers and analysts learn 
how to blend the insights of a number of models and perspectives and draw on a broad 
range of empirical evidence.  And I have emphasised the importance of the work of 
economic historians and political scientists, such as Schumpeter, Freeman, Crafts and 
Soskice, for whom processes of change, including the influence of and change in institutions, 
are of the essence in understanding how the world has changed, or could change. 
 
 Recognising the crucial questions around change and the type of perspective, theories and 
models that could be helpful in tackling them is the first step in formulating a research 
agenda for a dynamic public economics.  A second step is to recognise what we already have 
as a basis on which to build.  And in building a new dynamic public economics we must take 
care not to shoe-horn our modelling into familiar tools or workhorses which have limited 
capability to capture the issues at stake.  Some details have been offered in the paper, 
particularly in relation to climate change, but there are many further fundamental 
examples.  It is an exciting agenda.   
 
 Finally, I have tried, at the beginning of the paper, and at a number of places through the 
paper, to show the influence of Tony Atkinson’s ideas.  He challenged us all throughout the 
50 years of his academic career to ask the hard and important questions and to bring decent 
values to our work.  He insisted that we should identify and capture the crucial elements of 
the problem at hand and not try to force new and major issues into the existing, sometimes 
narrow, boxes and equipment with which we are most familiar.  He was constantly taking on 
the big issues and exploring.  He was a wonderful model, both as an economist and as a 
human being.  Had he lived, he would have been very involved in building a dynamic public 
economics.  His values, ideas, commitment and fine intelligence will surely inspire the next 
generation.  
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